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This essay presents a brief survey on some of the basic questions con-
cerning the Philosophy of Technology, including the different historical
perspectives regarding the part played by technology in human life and
societies. From the historical debate between the more pragmatic and the
more skeptical sides, the optimistic and pessimistic views, an answer is
proposed, finding support in a sociological point of view in what can be
interpreted as a contemporary marxist approach on these problems. This
work was developed in the context of the course An Introduction to the
History of Science given by Professor Luca Maria Possati, part of the Phi-
losophy degree at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of University of
Porto, Portugal.
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1 Introduction
Is technology just a tool? And, if it’s not, what part does it play in our
lives? How does it influence us and to what extent? Are we able to control it or
are we under its control? These are some of the key questions that arise when
we think about technology which seem to be getting more and more present
in our lives as the years go by in the path lead by humanity. Indeed, machines
are getting “smarter”, the topic of the day is something called machine learning
and the ones skilled in these self-learning and evolving algorithms (prequels to
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machines’ souls, one might have the audacity to say) are the modern champions
of humanity, like the sky navigators were in the XVI century’s sea exploration
or like the mechanical engineers were back in the industrial revolutions that
took place at the end of the last millennium.
This work is organized in the following way. In Section 2 the main questions
addressed in this essay are presented. In Section 3 the two classical schools of
thought on Philosophy of Technology are briefly introduced and, in Section 4,
some of the most important thinkers of each school are presented. The marxist
analysis on technological evolution and the role it plays in human life is then
discussed, in Section 5, as a connection between the two different paradigms of
thought. Finally, in Section 6, some conclusions and considerations are drawn,
later developments are briefly mentioned and a personal take on the questions
raised is proposed.
2 Technology as a means to an end?
We start by returning to the first question produced in the beginning of this
text: is technology just a tool? The question itself, of course, already says some-
thing about technology: that it is, in fact, a tool. There is no denial of this:
humans craft new objects, develop new artifacts in order to make their lives
better or easier in some sense. Even when the artifact reveals itself useless, there
is always some idea of practicality behind its development. The question is not,
therefore, if technology is a means to an end. The real question philosophers re-
flect upon is wether technology is merely a means to an end or if it is something
more with direct influence on the lives of the people who develop it in the first
place and use it on a daily basis.
Consider a hammer, for instance, a tool probably developed to address the
problem of attaching different objects together, or breaking them down, and
for protection. It is easy to see that even such a simple piece of ancient technol-
ogy produced direct consequences on humanity. Certainly there were physical
consequences on the workers using the hammer, in terms of physical posture,
hand musculature and so on. Some of these changes induced in the workers’
physique may be regarded as positive, some as negative, but it is evident that
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this new technology did transform, even if just slightly, the bodies of the hu-
mans using it. Additionally, the use of a new piece of technology can require
further adaptation and specific training towards an effective use of it. Without
realizing it, we have arrived to a point of connection between two different
types of skills: the physical and the technical.
Our example of the hammer might be too simplistic at this instance, but let’s
try to put ourselves in the place of the first humans that ever used a hammer and
imagine how it must have been for them. As much as the hammer constitutes an
example of a technology of straightforward application, one that even a primate
would be able to use, the fact is that, however negligible the learning curve for
its use might be, there is one and we can only speculate on how much adaptation
and skill mastery it took for the first who wielded it more than three million
years ago, deprived they were of any sort of experience to guide them. There
is, indeed, a particular skill needed to master the use of the hammer which, in
turn, contributed to the continuous perfection of this tool along the history of
mankind.
Nevertheless, these are not the fundamental changes that were alluded above.
There is a different set of changes induced by technology which are not physi-
cal or physically related such as skill development, but rather more profound,
deeply connected to human thought, changes that operate on the universe of
ideas that inhabit human minds and define, more than anything else, human
activity and human relations. The hammer, as any piece of technology, being a
tool, a means to an end, is meant to solve some problem in human experience.
With its invention, either that problem ceases to exist completely or it will start
to be perceived in a completely different manner. The problem of attaching
objects together was transformed with the hammer and workers changed their
thoughts on the subject. They stopped considering other alternatives, other
techniques and freed up some “thinking space” for a whole new set of problems
to be considered. There was a change, a real and effective change in the way
people thought about several problems concerning, for instance, construction.
Now if we drop the hammer example and pursue other types of more so-
phisticated technology, more subliminar in their use, more incorporated with
human activity, like automobiles, cellphones or the internet, then we can see
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how easily these kind of changes assume rather relevant, profound and delicate
consequences. We can refer to the so-called «embodied technology», that is, ar-
tifacts that are used as a part of one’s own body; «present at end» technology,
that is, artifacts used without any conscience of them, only acknowledging them
when they malfunction or break. It is easy to see the growing influence of such
artifacts in human mind and activity. As a starting point, there is a distinction
between the so-called ancient technology, like the hammer, somehow more lim-
ited and controllable in its effects on humanity, and the modern technology, of
which the many gadgets we are surrounded by are good examples of. In the next
section, a brief introduction of the two classical perspectives on this matter will
be presented.
3 Two schools of thought
Perhaps the crucial aspect when we think about technology lies within its
polymorphous essence. How can one define technology, specifically modern
technology, if not with a set of different concepts that join under this human
enterprise. Indeed, technology can be seen as an activity, of course, a human
activity, but also as knowledge, studied as an object or even as a volition, an
independent will. The branch of Philosophy devoted to this matter is called the
Philosophy of Technology and its many approaches can be grouped (Mitcham,
[19]) into two major schools of thought: the engineering and the humanities
discourses.
The name Philosophy of Technology, as the general discipline devoted to
this topic, was firstly used by Ernst Kapp, a German thinker of the engineering
line of thought, entitling is 1877 work Elements of a Philosophy of Technology,
[13]. Historically the first type of Philosophy of Technology, the engineer-
ing school owes its name to the fact of having developed on the shoulders of
Mechanical Philosophy, a line of thought whose aim was to explain all nat-
ural phenomena based on mechanical principles only, and of the Philosophy
of Manufactures, a first attempt of thinking about the new productive factory
industries as a whole different matter than ancient craft production.
These primordial lines of thought, which orbited around the industrial rev-
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olutions, were initially took upon by engineers or even scientists, like Newton
or Boyle for example, directly connected to the engineering process, that is,
with the invention and creation of new machines. Engineering Philosophy of
Technology can be defined, therefore, as an approach to understand technology
and its implications in human life and the world from within technology itself,
a somewhat more pragmatic analysis, centered on artifacts and its nature, its
concepts, methods, cognitive structures and objective manifestations.
From a completely different, sometimes depicted as romantic, viewpoint,
arises the Humanities Philosophy of Technology. The humanities school of
thought brings to the table perspectives that go beyond technology, in a com-
pletely different approach than the engineering school. Indeed, instead of study-
ing the consequences of technology in the world — like the engineering branch
does —, it considers how technology fits into a wider, and perhaps metaphysical,
conception of the world. Humanities Philosophy of Technology sits on the ba-
sic principle of primacy of humanities over technology and while Engineering
Philosophy of Technology is the first of the two branches to have developed,
humanities are undisputedly the birth bringers of technology in its first forms.
The thought of some important members of both branches will be briefly sur-
veyed in the following section. A detailed survey can be found, for instance, in
the first chapters of [19].
4 Some historical perspectives
Even before philosophers of the engineering branch started thinking about
technology, the Philosophy of Manufacturers, whose name is due to Scottish
physician and chemical engineer Andrew Ure, was developed with the aim of
devising the general principles that should guide productive industry with self-
acting machines (see [5]). The main topics of interest were the differences be-
tween craft and factory production, chemical and mechanical processes, to work
out a classification of machines, as well as coming up with a set of rules for in-
vention and studying the socioeconomic consequences of automatic machinery.
We can see that a substancial set of concerns were already addressed here in the
beginning of the XIX century, right at the center of the industrial revolution.
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One of the first members of the Engineering Philosophy of Technology was
the german philosopher Ernst Kapp, briefly mentioned in the previous section.
Kapp, who lived between 1808 and 1896, was also a geographer, deeply influ-
enced by the work of Carl Ritter, one of the founders of modern geography.
In the work of Kapp, [13], we see, therefore, a kind of environmental philos-
ophy that seeks to explain the social and cultural manifestations in relation to
the influence of the geography of the locations, like the influence of rivers on
population development. Kapp comes up with the idea of inner colonization,
that is, that technology presents itself as a way of human colonization of either
space, through agriculture, mining, architecture or civil engineering, and time,
through systems of communication, with the final objective of transforming na-
ture, the whole world, into a truly human habitat. Another of Kapp’s key con-
cepts is one he “took” and elaborated from Aristotle: that tools and weapons,
human artifacts in general, are just organ projections. In Kapp’s view each arti-
fact is just a tool developed, sometimes subconsciously, to enhance some human
organ capability, like the hook enhances the bent finger, the sword, the sturdy
position of the arm, or even the railroad and the telegraph can be interpreted
as nothing more than the enhancements of the human circulatory and nervous
systems, respectively.
Another influential thinker from the engineering branch was the German
physicist Friedrich Dessauer who lived almost a century later than Kapp, be-
tween 1881 and 1963. Although Dessauer recognized the importance of tech-
nology through engineering in the reshaping of human life, he also was deeply
concerned with the ethical problems around it. Together with Franz Xavier von
Hornstein, he published a book in 1945, whose german title could be translated
by as The soul under the influence of technology, [1]. Following Kant’s Critique of
Pure Reason, [12], he adds a fourth critique of technological making. Contrary
to Kant, Dessauer sees this aspect of human activity as being able to establish a
connection with the transcendental dimension where the true essence of things
exist. This property of technology is not present in industrial manufacture, nor
in the products themselves, but solely in the act of technical creation.
Peter Engelmeier, a Russian engineer, contemporary to Dessauer, very con-
cerned with the ethical and political problems around technology, divided this
act of creation into three constitutive parts: will, knowledge and skill. Other
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thinkers had similar approaches: DuBois-Reymond considered invention as a
psychological event and as a material artifact, while Max Eyth established the
difference between creative germination of an idea, its development and its final
use. In their own way, they all emphasize the role of creative inspiration in the
act of invention, identifying the figure of the engineer with the one of the artist,
in what can be interpreted as a clear connection with the humanities side (see
[19] for detailed references on these authors).
Nevertheless, although Dessauer considers nature and human purpose as
necessary conditions for human invention, he doesn’t consider them to be suf-
ficient, that is, there is a kind of invisible force that drives the whole process.
He calls it the inner working out, a force capable of establishing a connection
between the mind of the inventor and a fourth realm of preexistent solutions
to technical problems, a link between the world of ideas and the real world
where inventions work, a point of contact with the essence of things — there
is much of Plato’s theory of ideas in this conception. For Dessauer, the many
dramatic consequences of modern technology on the planet and human life are
evidence of this transcendent property of technology. Its power goes beyond
the control and expectations of its creators and brings into play forces that seem
supernatural, like for instance the atomic bomb. This singularity in Dessauer’s
thought drives him way from standard Engineering Philosophy of Technology
and brings him closer to the humanities side.
Dessauers’s religious conception of technology will be continued later on by
the Spanish-Venezuelan philosopher Juan David García Bacca (1901-1992) who
also considered the role of the inventor as central and supernatural, [6], — he
compared it to God’s own power of creation. Like God, human beings could
create things that could stand for themselves and he gives the example of the
computer, the perfect extension of human thought. This power is somehow
independent, with the ability of enhancing its creators or degrade and destroy
them. He defines technology as a per-objectifying and dis-alienating enterprise,
that is, a planned, humanly designed activity involving the creation of techno-
logical objects that execute their functions beyond accidental use with the final
aim of humanizing the natural universe.
Other thinkers from the engineering side worth mentioning were: Alfred
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Espinas, [3], a follower of Kapp’s organ projection theory who considered the
difference between techniques and two types of technology, systematic organi-
zation of some technique and the ones involving the generalization of principles;
Jacques Lafitte, [14], who coined the term mechanology, the discipline devoted
to the systematic study of the evolution of machines from passive to active and
reflexive; and Gilbert Simondon, [22], who examines machines dividing them
among elements of machines, individual machines and systems of machines.
When we turn our compass to the humanities school of thought we im-
mediately feel a shift to a more pessimistic or at least more cautious take on
technology. Among the philosophers of the humanities branch, there are four
fundamental representatives. Lewis Mumford, who lived between 1895 and
1976, is the first one. His line of thought starts by recognizing the limitations
of machines in their aim to imitate human organs, [20]. That imitation is always
imperfect and it creates a conflict between the organic and the non-organic that
often results in grave accidents. He distinguishes between the mimetic technolo-
gies and the purely symbolic ones like information technologies.
The key idea in Mumford’s philosophy is that it is not technology that de-
fines humanity nor it is the ability to create: what defines humanity is its ability
to think and interpret nature. Without technology Man would still be human,
Mumford acknowledges, but without the power of thinking, there wouldn’t be
much of a difference between Man and the other animals. In his critique, Mum-
ford distinguishes between the primordial forms of creation, the ones related
with life and basic human needs, which he calls polytechnics, and those forms
of authoritarian technics of creation intimately related with economic or mil-
itary superiority and expansion aspirations, which he calls monotechnics. For
Mumford, modern technology is just an example of monotechnics, which can
also be found along history’s pages in huge armies and organized work forces,
which he refers to as megamachines. This is where Mumford introduces his most
original idea known as the myth of the machine. Indeed, megamachines always
come with the promise of high benefits for all, hiding the hard truth behind
it that is: it comes with the cost of dehumanizing and depriving the people of
their own freedoms. Therefore, it is necessary to impose limitations to modern
technology’s uncontrolled expansion and, in view of that, Mumford points at
art and urban life as ways to do it.
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A completely different perspective is given out by the Spanish philosopher
José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) who conceives humanity as being defined by
its creative side, since humans, unlike other animals, aren’t born with a partic-
ular nature and have to “craft” their own existence in what can be regarded as
a very classical philosophical take on human essence. He describes, in [21], the
evolution of technics side by side with the evolution of science and analytical
and abstract thought and he doesn’t see any particular problem for humanity
regarding modern technology. The only issue he foresees is a certain tendency
for humanity to hand in the development of technology to mere technicians,
that is, people devoid of imagination and creativity, which, in his opinion, are
the crucial faculties that drive human evolution.
The third name in this shortlist of the humanities philosophers is the Ger-
man philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). His thought, present in [9],
shares a certain metaphysical and ontological perspective on technology that
we can also find in Ortega, a certain inevitability, like an invisible hand that
we cannot control. Like Ortega, the projection of humanity into the world
through technology is not natural or organic: it is disruptive. However, Hei-
degger’s view shares no fraction of the optimism present in Ortega’s thought.
In a similar form than Mumford’s, Heidegger distinguishes between ancient and
modern technology and focuses on this last one. He defines it as a revealing that
prepares and challenges nature, extracting from it a kind of unnatural energy
that can be stored and transmitted for later usage. Modern artifacts are, there-
fore, qualified as a standing reserve as they stand ready and available to be used in
anyways considered necessary. Unlike ancient technology, modern technology
doesn’t adapt to the environment. On the contrary, they change it dramati-
cally, as modern artifacts forms are hostages to their internal structure. Modern
technology doesn’t create: it unlocks a natural potential, harvests it, stores it
and transmits it. One could eventually argue that some of these consequences
emerge from mass production and the economic system, but Heidegger dis-
agrees: it is the very nature of the objects produced which don’t have inherent
value — their value is given by human usage only. Additionally, Heidegger sees
modern science enslaved by modern technology’s logic, as an exercise of sep-
arating the world from its natural essence, in a process of objectification. For
him, modern science is theoretical technology more than modern technology
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being an applied science.
When Heidegger is asked to elaborate on the technological revealing, the
original concept introduced by himself, he takes a step deeper into the transcen-
dent. Indeed, Heidegger comes up with another concept, that he calls Ge-stell,
a transcendental precondition for modern technology above any individual or
collective human decision. Ge-stell is an attitude towards the world, an im-
personal will that challenges the world and sets up the conditions for the im-
plementation of the standing reserve. It is clear, therefore, that for Heidegger
human will, being important, it is not the more relevant or, at least, not the
only force that generates modern technology: it is also the nature of reality
itself that opens up to its own exploitation. Ontologically speaking, Heideg-
ger’s proposition contains serious consequences regarding the being, the essence
of things and, coincidentally, Heidegger’s main philosophical topic of interest:
according to this philosopher, the being of things can only be revealed by a
supernatural force that he calls Ge-stell. In other words, we cannot truly under-
stand technology in terms of itself, of its artifacts, of craft or its human creation,
which constitutes a definite criticism on Engineering Philosophy of Technol-
ogy thinkers, although one can easily see a link between Ge-stell and Dessauer’s
inner working out. Usually, Heidegger is seen as a philosopher who follows
the socratic school, valuing more the questioning method than the proposition
of answers or solutions to the problems at hand. His view regarding modern
technology is a pessimistic one, qualifying it as dogmatic, authoritarian and in-
evitably overpowering the human race — he doesn’t believe it to be a neutral
force like Ortega does. His study is based on the first-person perspective and
his, therefore, classified as a phenomenological approach on the subject.
The last thinker from the Humanities Philosophy of Technology to be men-
tioned in this brief survey is Jacques Ellul, a French philosopher who lived
between 1912 and 1994 and that maintains Heidegger’s pessimistic tone. Much
like Heidegger, Ellul elects modern technology, and not capital or the economy,
as the dominant force in the development of the world and he defines it as the
sum of all methods rationally developed aiming at absolute efficiency in every
domain of human activity, [2]. He distinguishes between technical operations,
the technology limited by its context of use, and the technical phenomenon, the
essence of modern technology, the form of making and using artifacts which
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tends to dominate and absorb all other forms of human activity, similar to the
social manifestation of Heidegger’s Ge-stell. In Ellul’s view, the problems cre-
ated by technology are only dealt with upon the creation of more technology
which seems to increase and develop according to its own laws, uncontrollable,
spreading its influence to every area of human activity in what can be described
as a technological determinism.
As it was seen, for instance with Dessauer or Ortega, there isn’t always a
very defined border dividing engineering and humanities thinkers. Some at-
tempts at joining the two different sides were made along history, like the ones
of John Dewey and Don Ihde. In the following section the most relevant bridge
between the engineering and the humanities branches, in the scope of this work,
will be presented.
5 Marxism, a bridge between different perspectives
Capitalism’s critique, the most important part in Karl Marx’s thought, is en-
dowed with a profound philosophical analysis of technology. Marx devotes an
entire chapter, chapter XV, of his 1867 main work Capital, [17], to this subject.
This analysis can be regarded as one of the most relevant bridges built to con-
nect the engineering and the humanities schools of thought in the Philosophy
of Technology.
Karl Marx, who lived in the XIX century between the years 1818 and 1883,
was a contemporary of Ernst Kapp and they both shared many political views.
Even their academic paths exhibit relevant similarities. Both of them can be
regarded as interpreters of Hegel’s thought, but while Kapp did so in regard of
modern geography, Marx was influenced by the new discipline of sociology and
by economics.
The Lordship and Bondage passage from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, [8],
is of particular relevance. Also known as the master-slave relationship, it is a key
element in Hegel’s philosophical system, a fundamental governing premisse of
all social relations. It can be interpreted in the following points: the lordship
(master) affirms his dignity and frees himself from nature by demanding the
bondsman (slave) to supply all his needs; in order to do so, the bondsman under-
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takes technological work and «realizes that it is precisely in his work wherein he
seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his own»,
«[t]rough work (...) the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is» [8],
that is, he acknowledges his own dignity and that he can transform the world,
less noble than he is; from such epiphany, a drive for technological progress is
created, which can also free the slave from the physical environment and create
an ideal society of free and equal citizens, «the whole of objective being», [8].
Marx considers Hegel’s proposition and adds the idea, taken from utopian
socialists, that technology can promote human welfare but, in order to do so,
social reorganization, not a rhetorical but an effective one, must be undertook.
In order to devise such a reordering of society, it is fundamental, in Marx’s
view, to proceed with a thorough study of the production process which is more
than just technical. The basic premiss of the marxist analysis of the production
process can be found right in the beginning of the Theses on Feuerbach, [18],
where human life is described as a «sensuous activity, practice» and not just an
object of contemplation like materialists believed. This activity extracts certain
materials from nature and transforms them for particular human needs. In view
of this, Marx considers the capitalist world as «an immense accumulation of
commodities», [17], instead of a set of ideas, as idealist philosophers advocated,
with the «single commodity» being its unit element. Hence, the analysis of this
single commodity constitutes the starting point of his critique.
For Marx, the first fundamental mistakes of modern economy are failing
to recognize the social nature of the production processes and that the indi-
vidual commodities, the consumer products, are not independent from those
processes. At this point, Marx emends Hegel’s theory: he replaces the general,
sometimes spiritual, concept of work in Hegel with the concept of real work:
real work is key to human achievement and social transformation. The marxist
concept of labour can be seen as a general concept that includes technology and
technological development, related to production and social organization. In
the beginning of chapter VII of [17], Marx describes it as:
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Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate,
and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material
re-actions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her
own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces
of his body, in order to appropriate Nature’s productions in a form adapted to
his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the
same time changes his own nature.
There is something ontological in the short passage above. Work is no mere
human activity, it is an essence, a purpose revealed in Man’s ever struggle against
hostile nature in the context of his larger destiny of humanizing the world, a
process where Man and Nature come together as a whole. In that path, labour
is revealed not to be a simple tool either, changing man’s nature in the process.
Moreover, labour is seen as the primordial elementary factor of production, as
the other elementary factors, the material, that is, the «subject of the work», and
the instruments of labour, are always the result of some previous production
process: «[a]ll raw material is the subject of labour, but not every subject of
labour is raw material», [17]. Therefore, what is crucial is not the products
produced and what instruments were involved but the production processes
themselves. Those who control the processes, the bourgeois, control the wealth
of society.
When studying Marx’s views on technology, one should never separate them
from the broader aim in his theory: to produce a critique of political economy,
as it clearly states the “Kantian” subtitle of his work Capital, [17], to expose the
fundamental flaws and contradictions of capitalism. From what was referred
above, it was natural for Marx to conclude that political economy had been
linked to class interests and, therefore, been unable to release the immense lib-
erating potential that modern technology contains in itself towards, as Hegel’s
predicted, the creation of a new and ideal society of true freedom and equality.
Hence, in order to liberate political economy from its bourgeois domination,
Marx starts a new analysis of the production process, examining the way that
instruments of labour are converted from tools into machines and the way ma-
chines themselves tend to be organized in complex production systems. Marx’s
conclusion is that modern technology tends to diminish the worker, to take
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away his power, control and influence over the production process, reducing
him to a mere operating function, equal, interchangeable and replaceable in the
context of the autonomous factory. While in the past the worker was a crucial
part of the production process as he possessed a kind of fundamental knowl-
edge not easily obtained, the factory worker is just someone that performs a
sequence of simple, easy to learn tasks with minimal connection to the produc-
tion process itself.
These conclusions also emerge from Marx’s analysis of the division of labour.
The mechanization of technology is connected to the mechanization of the
work force: starting with the division of labour into simple tasks, this pro-
cess of simplification allowed machines to evolve and develop. This resulted in
what Marx portrays as the alienation and physical degradation of the worker in
the production process and it is deeply connected to the enhancing of the profit
in the modern economy. Like it is written in the beginning of chapter XV of
[17]:
John Suart Mill says in his Principles of Political Economy: “It is questionable if
all the mechanical inventions yet made have lightened the day’s toil of any hu-
man being.” That is, however, by no means the aim of the capitalistic application
of machinery. Like every other increase in the productiveness of labour, machin-
ery is intended to cheapen commodities, and, by shortening that portion of the
working-day, in which the labourer works for himself, to lengthen the other por-
tion that he gives, without an equivalent, to the capitalist. In short, it is a means
for producing surplus-value.
Indeed, modern economy treats labour as a mere input in its exchange-values
dynamics. Like materials, for instance, labour is seen just as a cost in the produc-
tion process instead of an element deeply connected to the global social engine
that drives the economy. In view of this, while the market behavior as a whole
cannot be controlled, technology emerges as the most effective way to bring
down labour costs and keep them under sustained pressure, this way allowing
the production owners to keep increasing and maximizing their profits.
Nevertheless, production is seen as the large purpose of human nature, its
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ultimate starting point and the predominant factor in the analysis of the species
— productivity is the species essence. The human being, in Marxist view, is a
producer, an animal laboraus, whose goal and fulfillment is to remake hostile
nature into a humanized world, a utopian perfection, as Hegel predicted. In
this way, considering technology as an essencial component in human purpose,
Marx endows modern technology with an ontological ingredient.
In the thought of Marx technology has, thus, an ambivalent nature or poten-
tial. Just as it plays a crucial role in the problem of industrial capitalism, as it was
determined by Marx’s production process analysis, which was described above,
it will also play an equally crucial role in the creation of a better version of so-
ciety: Marx admires modern machinery as he sees in it the potential to change
the world for the better. In the so-called socialist society, socialized technology
would have the power to eliminate scarcity from the face of the planet and,
moreover, to put an end to, what he called, the metaphysical alienation that has
challenged philosophers. Technology is, therefore, seen as being capable to ac-
complish what philosophy and religion have failed to achieve in human history,
allowing humanity to affirm itself in the real world and not just in the mind or
spiritual realm. It does this by humanizing the world, making it a reflection of
human powers. It is a kind of revealing, not in the same way as Heidegger’s, but
one that extends from humanity as a whole to the individual. While under cap-
italist economy, where individuals own the means of production, workers are
always «wage-slaves» in the production process, in a communist society, where
the means of production are no longer privately owned, a worker can freely
chose between a variety of equalized jobs. This will allow each individual to
chose his true calling and achieve professional accomplishment, as he can even
do one job in one day and another in the following: «thus makes it possible for
me to do one thing today and another tomorrow», [18]. In this way, modern
technology can allow true human freedom.
6 Some considerations and further developments
Marxism analyses of technology offers, through its concept of labour, a con-
ciliating perspective between the two schools of Philosophy of Technology sur-
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veyed in Section 3. On the one hand, Marxism performs a thorough analysis
of technology itself, its constituent elements and its processes within industrial
production. From this analysis, Marx derives consequences, sometimes dra-
matic, on human life at the individual or collective level. This approach can
be identified with Engineering Philosophy of Technology line of thought, like
it was observed in Section 4. Particularly, there are strong affinities with the
thought of Marx’s contemporary Ernst Kapp. For instance, we can find Kapp’s
inner colonization concept well within Marx’s thought. On the other hand,
Marx extends its analysis on technology to a deeper, ontological plane. He
identifies it as a purpose, a revealing of humanity’s essence and calling and a
way to humanize the world, creating a truly free society of equal citizens over
the constrains of the hostile environment. It is a revealing but in a very different
way than Heidegger’s proposition. There is something of Heidegger’s Ge-stell
or Ellul’s technical phenomenon involved, but there is also a firm rejection of
a pessimist attitude towards modern technology, though recognizing its dual
potential.
As it was underlined in Section 5, modern technology has both the poten-
tial to serve capitalist exploitation of human labour, reducing the individual to
a mere replaceable piece in the production process, ever lowering its value and
cost in the profit-chain, and also to serve a communist economy, freeing hu-
man labour to develop itself in any branch of activity it wishes, attaining life
fulfillment in a rather platonic metaphysical interpretation of human life. We
can, therefore, propose the following philosophical interpretation of technol-
ogy. While we made abundantly clear, in Section 2, that technology is not just a
tool or a means to an end, that it transforms human lives on a physical and men-
tal level, modifying our cognitive constructs, our way of thinking and so on, it
is also clear that it does not affect everyone in the same manner. Under modern
society, where some variation of capitalist economy is implemented, the ef-
fects of technology and innovation contribute to the accumulation of profit like
never before in human history allowing a small fraction of the population to
live under privileged conditions while the majority of the population struggles
to secure a job to pay only for their basic needs, always facing the permanent
threat of replacement by other humans or by technological advance. It’s unde-
niable that the effect of modern technology on the lives of the second group is
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very different from the effect on the first group.
Additionally, it is rather naive to blindly advocate for technology determin-
ism, like Heidegger or Ellul do, that is, to believe that there is an inorganic
will, a non-human volition that exists within modern technology and that de-
termines its own path and development. It seems to be true that technology’s
effects on human life have a certain degree of uncontrollability and are somehow
unexpected. Human history is also abundant in examples where technological
failure was addressed with the development of new forms of technology in what
seems to be a never-ending cyclic path. However, to disregard the human touch
in the process and the human choice that keeps presenting itself at every in-
stance of this path seems to be plain irrational. Ellul, who lived a century later
than Marx, completely misses the point of Marxism, in my opinion, when he
referred that, if Marx had lived during the twentieth century, he would have re-
placed capital with technology as the dominant driving force in human societies.
Every artifact developed, every piece of modern technology, contains a precise
human intention behind it. It serves a purpose, although the consequences may
be undetermined. Moreover, there is the irrefutable question of choice: every
technological development can be used in, at least, two very different ways, just
as radiation can be used to cure or to destroy. The way we use it is undeniably
a matter of our own choice. Like Marx points out, technology can be used as
effectively for human exploitation, in the context of a profit-driven capitalist
economy, or for human freedom and species achievement, in the context of a
socialized economy. It can make workers struggle more and more for work
and stable income, or it could as easily free them from tight schedules, lighten
their work’s physical demands and provide more time and possibility for fam-
ily, educational, cultural and personal growth. To deny this evidence doesn’t
seem to be reasonable in the same way it is not rational to disregard the obvious
responsibilities of the economic system in the process while, at the same time,
adding all the responsibilities of human development to an invisible, intangible,
omniscient, omnipotent, god-like technological volition.
Marxist ideas naturally produced an abundant intellectual heritage. Jürgen
Habermas, for instance, derived his own social theory from marxist roots, fo-
cusing on communication and interpretation as a guide for development, [7].
Herbert Marcuse, [16], argues for deep transformations in science and technol-
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ogy and his student, William Leiss, [15], defended that the states, that is, the
governments, should actively assist their citizens to empower them with the
knowledge to use technology in mass quantities and to help them understand
the choices in play. The main idea behind these neo-marxist approaches is that
informed citizenship and enlightened public policies are the true antidotes for
the technological fatalism and oppression Heidegger’s phenomenology warned
us about.
The transition between the millennia brought us, however, a different type
of critique of Heidegger’s pessimistic phenomenology. In the end of the twenti-
eth century, Don Ihde, [10, 11], developed a line of thought (part of the so-called
empirical turn in the approaches regarding the Philosophy of Technology), that
he called postphenomenology, which views technology not as a threat to hu-
manity, but as an integral part of it. Postphenomenologists, like Ihde or, more
recently, Peter Verbeek, try to understand technology’s essential role in human
life in what constitutes a pragmatic approach that also involves phenomenol-
ogy and hermeneutics. In this sense, postphenomenology is not very different
from traditional phenomenology as it sees in technology the same kind of driv-
ing invisible force, independent from humanity, neglecting the importance of
social dynamics in the whole technological evolution process. In view of this,
postphenomenology cannot stand as a true alternative to marxism as a broad
theory that connects different perspectives as it’s unable to provide a holistic
and comprehensive answer to the many challenges technological development
presents. Hence, postphenomenology becomes an easy target to criticism of
either neo-marxists or socialist thinkers, like Marcuse, or other lines of thought
like the post-structuralism of Michel Foucault.
One of the most relevant criticisms with regard to the postphenomenology
line of thought comes from the American philosopher Andrew Feenberg and
his instrumentalization theory, [4]. Clearly inspired by Marx, Feenberg de-
fends social relations and social choices as critical concepts in the definition of
the evolution of existing technology, establishing an intimate relation between
technology, politics and democracy. It is the social relations ever present in
every aspect of human activity, and not some kind of invisible spirit endowed
with technological volition, that truly govern the process of technological devel-
opment. Heidegger’s Ge-stell or Ellul’s technical phenomenon are, therefore,
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nothing but illusions promoted by a political system that drives people away
from the technological processes and ownership, promoting capitalist exploita-
tion and the submission to an expanding consumption society. Instead, politics
could play a decisive role to empower the populations regarding technology, like
Leiss defended, and put technological development at the service of improving
general living conditions and the progress of mankind as a whole.
Surely, there is much left to say about the questions raised in this short essay.
Philosophy of Science and Technology is nowadays one of the most exciting and
productive fields of Philosophy and the new technological developments never
cease to challenge us with new problems never before considered. Social media,
self-learning algorithms, adaptable technology, artificial intelligence are just a
few of the hot topics that raise ethical and moral concerns which used to exist
only in the domain of the most imaginative science fiction pages and, indeed,
the development of modern technology often seems to be completely out of
our control, transforming our lives, routines and social dynamics. The focus of
this work, however, was to reject this predestination some philosophers seem
to be resigned to and Marxism provides a solid background to have another
take on the subject. At the source of every technological development there
is a basic human choice but that choice is not to be made by the average man
but, instead, by just a few of us that hold the power to make those decisions.
Clearly, technology cannot be seen as a mere means to an end, as it affects and
transforms the lives of every person under its influence. However, it does not
affect everyone in the same way and the ones in the higher positions of power,
the ones that are able to make the political decisions and to influence the masses
have a high degree of control over this phenomenon. To understand that there
is a choice to be made, different paths that can be taken, constitutes just the
first step in reclaiming the power of humanity over technology. ıt is in the
development of an educated and cultured mind, to be able to fully understand
the consequences of each choice, regarding the set of ethical and moral values
which are meaningful for us, that lies the significant change humanity has to
undertake. If that is to happen, then truly revolutionary transformations on
political, social and cultural levels are necessarily on their way.
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